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ESSAY: RESTRUCTURING CORPORATE 
DEBT IN THE CONTEXT OF A SYSTEMIC 
CRISIS 
SEAN HAGAN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
If one reviews the debt problems facing the membership of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) today—particularly in Central and Eastern Europe—it is 
relatively clear that the most immediate challenges relate to the restructuring of 
nonsovereign debt. For this reason, the focus of this brief contribution will be 
on the difficulty of designing and implementing debt restructuring frameworks 
in the nonsovereign and, in particular, the corporate context. Of course, these 
issues possess a sovereign dimension in at least two respects. First, it is clear 
that the debt crisis faced by many of our members is systemic in nature and 
accordingly, will require some degree of intervention by the government—even 
if the debt is held on the balance sheet of the corporate sector. Second, to the 
extent that government intervention involves financial assistance, such 
assistance may raise issues regarding the sustainability of the government’s own 
indebtedness. 
An understanding of the IMF’s perspective of these issues requires a brief 
overview of the nature of our involvement. The IMF provides financial 
assistance to its members in order to assist them in addressing their balance of 
payments problems. Before it does so, however, it must make a determination 
that two conditions have been met. First, since its resources are to be used to 
help countries resolve their balance of payments problems, it is important that 
the country be implementing policies that will address—rather than simply 
delay the resolution of—its balance of payments problems. Second, the IMF 
must ensure that “adequate safeguards” are in place to ensure that the member 
will be in a position to repay the IMF within the relatively short timeframe 
mandated under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, generally three to five years. 
“Conditionality” refers to the mechanism whereby IMF financial assistance 
is made conditional upon the effective implementation of a credible adjustment 
program, thereby ensuring, in turn, that the above conditions are in place. The 
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adoption of appropriate adjustment policies is designed not only to give the 
IMF some assurance that the underlying cause of the member’s balance of 
payments problems will be corrected, but also to provide the IMF with an 
adequate basis to conclude that the member will have sufficient financial 
recourse to repay the IMF once the adjustment program has been successfully 
implemented. 
It should be emphasized that the amount of financing provided by the IMF 
has traditionally been relatively modest in comparison with a member’s needs. 
However, the IMF’s judgment that the member’s adjustment program merits 
financial support is intended to “catalyze” financial assistance from other 
sources and, in the medium term, facilitate return to capital markets. 
II 
THE IMF’S APPROACH TO CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE—COMPARISON 
TO THE ASIAN CRISIS 
In response to the recent financial crisis, the IMF has been providing 
financial assistance in support of adjustment efforts to a number of countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In looking at both the nature of their problems 
and their adjustment programs, there are clear similarities with the countries we 
assisted during the Asian crisis. In terms of the underlying balance of payments 
problems, in Central and Eastern Europe, a number of countries had 
experienced explosive growth that had been fueled by foreign borrowing. This 
borrowing had been facilitated by a fixed exchange rate that made loans both 
easier to secure and easier to service. Unfortunately, this growth created 
enormous and unsustainable increases in asset prices, including in the housing 
sector. This resulted, in turn, in a lack of confidence among foreign creditors in 
the sustainability of policies—including exchange rate policies. As in the case of 
Asia, this lack of confidence resulted in capital outflows and, because the 
authorities did not have adequate resources to meet these outflows, the 
exchange rate suffered a large depreciation. Importantly, since much of the 
borrowing incurred by the banking, corporate, and household sector had been 
denominated in foreign exchange, this borrowing resulted in the 
overindebtedness of large portions of the banking and corporate sector. 
As with the IMF-supported programs in Asia, a key element of the IMF’s 
assistance in several of these countries has involved supporting a more realistic 
exchange rate policy that would, among other things, boost competitiveness. As 
a result of the dislocation in the balance sheets of the banks, corporations, and 
households caused by the depreciation, the programs have also focused on a 
comprehensive debt restructuring strategy. 
Notwithstanding the similarities with the Asian crisis, however, there are 
important differences. 
First, the problems in Asia were triggered exclusively by a loss of confidence 
in the policies of those countries. In Central and Eastern Europe, the outflows 
have also been exacerbated by the deleveraging process that occurred at a 
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global level due to the problems experienced in a number of developed 
countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Second, during the Asian crisis, the stabilization program was achieved 
through a combination of external financing from the IMF (and other official 
creditors) and economic adjustment. Although there had been widespread 
insolvency in the banking and corporate sectors, there was no need to rely on 
exchange controls. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, this has not always 
been the case. Most notably, in Iceland, the authorities have had little choice 
but to rely on comprehensive exchange controls to staunch capital outflows and 
thereby ensure the effectiveness of the stabilization programs. While these 
controls were in place before the IMF approved the relevant stand-by 
arrangement, the IMF recognized that, at least in the short term, these controls 
were necessary given that the amount of external financing being provided, 
even when coupled with the economic adjustment being implemented, was 
outstripped by the level of capital outflows. 
A key issue facing the countries in Central and Eastern Europe that have 
been affected by the crisis relates to the design and implementation of a 
corporate restructuring strategy. As in the case of the Asian crisis, the 
overindebtedness of a large portion of the corporate sector has been triggered 
not only by exchange rate depreciation but also by the collapse in availability of 
credit arising from the insolvency of large portions of the banking sector. 
Moreover, as in the Asian crisis, it is recognized that the restructuring of 
corporate debt owed to nonresidents is necessary in order to regain access to 
capital markets. More generally, of course, reducing the debt burden of the 
corporations is a necessary condition for achieving greater employment and 
economic growth. 
III 
LESSONS FROM THE ASIAN CRISIS 
Accordingly, when contemplating the difficulties that are currently being 
confronted in Central and Eastern Europe, it is natural to reflect upon lessons 
that can be learned from the corporate restructuring that took place during the 
Asian crisis. During the Asian crisis, government intervention supported the 
restructuring process in three areas. First, the government established a legal 
and institutional framework that would support the rehabilitation and 
liquidation of enterprises, primarily through the adoption of insolvency laws 
and the strengthening of the judicial system. Second, and relatedly, the 
government established out-of-court frameworks that facilitated such 
restructurings, albeit in the shadow of the formal insolvency system. Finally, to 
the extent to which the sovereign became a creditor to the corporate sector by 
virtue of its acquisition of liabilities through the bank restructuring process, it 
also played a leading role in the negotiation strategy—often, through the 
leverage gained by stronger legal enforcement powers that had been conferred 
upon it in the enabling legislation. At the time, the prevailing view was that, as a 
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matter of principle, public funds should not be used to support corporate 
restructuring. There was a concern that such intervention would engender 
moral hazard: by shielding both creditors and corporate debtors from their 
losses, this intervention would only encourage risky behavior going forward. 
Although public funds were used to support the restructuring of the banking 
sector, the provision of these funds was considered an appropriate step given 
both the systemic implications of the collapse of the banking sector and the 
preexisting public exposure arising from the deposit guarantee system. 
IV 
WHY MORE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION MAY BE NECESSARY 
Looking at the challenges currently faced by the IMF’s members regarding 
the overindebtedness of their corporate sectors, there are several reasons why a 
more robust role for the government may be necessary going forward. At the 
outset, one needs to acknowledge that recent events have demonstrated that 
moral hazard concerns have been superseded by others. The level and depth of 
government intervention in industrial countries, including financial 
intervention, has been unprecedented. As evidenced by the U.S. intervention in 
the automobile industry, this intervention has been extended to the corporate 
sector. It is difficult to continue to apply the principle of moral hazard rigidly in 
emerging markets when it is being applied rather more flexibly elsewhere. 
Moreover, one of the lessons of the Asian crisis is that it is important to 
manage expectations as to how quickly insolvency reform can be implemented. 
As a legal matter, amendments to an insolvency law cannot be introduced in 
isolation; they often require legislative modifications in other areas, including 
contract enforcement and civil procedure. In addition, meaningful reform 
involves more than just the adoption of legislation. Perhaps more than any 
other legal framework, an effective insolvency system requires a competent 
institutional infrastructure composed not only of the judiciary, but also of 
professional trustees. As the experience of Asia demonstrates, an insolvency 
law is as weak as the weakest institution that is charged with implementing it. In 
addition, the implementation of an insolvency law during a crisis is complicated 
by the pressure that vested interests often bring to bear. Since the introduction 
of new laws or the amendments to these laws apply to existing debt, introducing 
new rules to address an outstanding debt overhang makes the legislative process 
a politically charged one. Finally, during a crisis, even the most effective 
insolvency system may be overcome by the number of cases presented. While 
an out-of-court framework can assist in this respect, many successful cases will 
need to be processed through the formal system in order to take advantage of 
the cram-down provisions of the law (that is, the use of pre-packaged or “fast-
track” bankruptcy). 
Even if government is successful in putting in place a corporate debt 
restructuring framework through the establishment of both a formal and out-of-
court system, the question remains as to whether it will actually be used. 
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Although an effective system should give creditors the legal leverage they need 
to bring debtors to the table, experience demonstrates that many creditors will 
prefer to bide their time until the economy recovers sufficiently to strengthen 
the debt servicing capacity of the debtor. Of course, if all creditors take this 
position, the overall restructuring process will be delayed, thereby undermining 
the recovery. The problem may be viewed as a form of market failure and is 
exacerbated by the fact that in many of these countries, there is very little 
experience with corporate debt restructuring. 
Given the above, it is relatively clear that the government may need to 
provide additional incentives beyond an insolvency framework in order to 
catalyze the restructuring process. Whether these incentives are financial or 
regulatory in nature will depend on the situation of the country in question. For 
example, in some cases, it may be possible for the government to provide 
financing incentives in the form of guarantees on the restructured claims. 
However, the viability of this approach will depend on the amount of fiscal 
space available to the government. In some Central and Eastern European 
countries, this problem is complicated by the fact that there is also pressure on 
the sovereign to support the restructuring of consumer debt. For example, a 
good portion of the mortgages in Hungary and the Ukraine were denominated 
in foreign exchange and accordingly, the subsequent depreciation has had a 
devastating impact on the balance sheets of that sector. Not surprisingly, there 
has been considerable pressure on the government to provide some form of 
financial support in this area. It should be noted that this problem was not 
present during the Asian crisis. 
When contemplating the design and implementation of a corporate 
restructuring strategy in the context of a systemic crisis, it is necessary to 
consider not only the instruments that will be the most effective, but also the 
sequencing of the strategy. In particular, it is unreasonable to expect that there 
will be a restructuring of corporate sector debt before macroeconomic 
stabilization has been achieved. While values and prices are uncertain, creditors 
and debtors are unlikely to be in a position to conclude agreements. Moreover, 
one of the other lessons from the Asian crisis is that one needs a minimum level 
of stability in the banking sector before a corporate restructuring strategy can 
be implemented. Such stability may require significant recapitalization. Unless 
banks are in a financial position to write down the value of their loans, they will 
not be in a position to agree to the level of debt reduction that will be necessary 
to ensure the viability of the corporation in question. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the complexity of the issues identified above, it may be tempting 
to seek simpler and faster solutions. Unfortunately, the IMF has not been able 
to identify them. Across-the-board restructurings achieved through government 
fiats that do not involve enterprise-by-enterprise analysis and negotiations 
HAGAN 11/15/2010 
6 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:1 
among creditors and debtors can do lasting damage to the investment climate of 
the country concerned. While a lesson from the Asian crisis is that the 
government needs to be proactively involved in establishing incentives for the 
rapid and orderly restructuring process, it should not substitute itself for the 
parties concerned. 
